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AN INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST MAGAZINE

FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS

THE EDITORS

CLASS AND VOTING IN BRITAIN

RAYMOND WILLIAMS

BITTERSWEET PILLS

ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

VOL. 11

9

India: Shock And Revelation

CORLISS LAMONT

EDITORS . . . LEO HUBERMAN . . . PAUL M. SWEEZY

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NOTES FROM THE EDITORS

Hats off to the *Nation* for its October 31 special issue entitled *The Shame of New York*. It has been a long time since the appearance of an exposé on a par with the best work of the muckrakers of 50 years ago. This one, by Fred J. Cook and Gene Gleason, is all of that. If you haven't already obtained a copy and studied it with the care it deserves, we urge you to do so. Send your order, with 50¢, to the *Nation*, 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, N. Y.

There are so few voices on the Left that the departure of any one of them is an occasion for concern. We were sorry, therefore, to learn that the December issue of *The American Socialist* was to be its last—after six years of publication. We have made arrangements with the editors to fill out their unexpired subscriptions with copies of *Monthly Review*. We welcome these new readers and hope they will stay with us. Those who subscribe to both magazines will have their MR subs extended for the duration of their remaining *American Socialist* subscription.

Some of our readers buy every book that MR Press puts out on the theory that whatever we publish is good and belongs in a socialist library. Our next book should give them pause—and rightly so. It is entitled *The Jazz Scene*,
(continued on inside back cover)

FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS

January, 1960. A new month, a new year, and a new decade. What do the 1960s hold in store?

Much that no one can now foresee, of course. Perhaps even much that no one can now even imagine. But also much that seems to be irrevocably predetermined by deep-seated forces which have been operating to shape the present and give every sign of continuing to operate in the visible future. It is to these foreseeable developments of the years ahead that we would like to direct your attention in what follows.

The largest, and in our judgment the least uncertain, of these foreseeable developments is the continued rapid rise of socialism and decline of capitalism on the world-historical stage. The struggle between the two systems is in a very real sense universal. It exists inside both the capitalist and the socialist countries, and it also exists inside the countries that are as yet neither capitalist nor socialist. But so far as the relatively near future is concerned, the decisive arena is likely to be *between* the capitalist countries and the socialist countries. And here there are two great contests under way—contests which people everywhere are watching with an intensity and fascination that spring from a growing sense that the very fate of humanity is being decided under their eyes. The first of these contests, of course, is between the world's two strongest industrial powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The second is between the world's most populous countries, India and China. Let us take a camera-eye view of each in turn.

American Capitalism Versus Soviet Socialism

In hearings before the Joint Economic Committee last April, Professor Raymond W. Goldsmith of New York University and the National Bureau of Economic Research, one of the country's leading authorities in the field of national income statistics, presented new calculations of America's overall economic growth over the 120-year period from 1839 to 1959.* According to Goldsmith's findings, the

* "Employment, Growth, and Price Levels: Part 2—Historical and Comparative Rates of Production, Productivity, and Prices," Hearings before the Joint Economic Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., pursuant to S. Con. Res. 13. April 7, 8, 9, and 10, 1959.

rate of increase of real per capita Gross National Product (GNP), which is perhaps the most comprehensive index of economic growth we have, was remarkably steady at a figure of approximately 1 5/8ths percent per annum over the whole period. There were deviations, of course, but in only two periods (the 1870s and the 1930s) did the figure fall more than 10 percent below the trend, and only in World War II did it rise more than 10 percent above the trend. There is, incidentally, no warrant in Goldsmith's statistics for the popular view that the rate of increase is "naturally" higher in the early stages of industrialization and is bound to taper off later on: for this period of United States history, at any rate, no systematic retardation of the rate of growth of real per capita GNP seems to have been in operation.

How does this record compare with that of Russia? A Joint Economic Committee member soon asked the inevitable question, and Goldsmith was ready with an answer based on the work of the best American authorities on the USSR. From 1860 to 1913, Goldsmith estimated, Russian real per capita GNP grew at an average rate of about 1 percent, that is to say, well below the long-term American rate. From 1913 to 1958, the average rate was between 2 and 2½ percent, above the American rate but not sensationally so. However, as Goldsmith emphasized, this figure is not very significant, because during this 45-year span "there were two long periods which economically were 'lost,' in which there was no net increase in output at all—from 1913 to 1928 and from 1940 to 1948." To get a more meaningful comparison, Goldsmith took the years since the losses of World War II were made good and found that the average per capita rate of growth of GNP from 1951 to 1958, "by Soviet terms probably a reasonably normal period," was from 4½ to 5½ percent per annum. What this means is that the Soviet rate of growth in recent years has been just about three times that of the United States long-term trend.

Actually, the comparison is undoubtedly too favorable for the United States, since there is strong evidence of a lag in the American rate of growth during the last few years. As summed up by W. S. Woytinsky, writing in *The New Leader* of November 30th: "The average annual rate of growth of the total GNP has been only 1.5 percent in 1953-58, in contrast to 4.6 percent in 1947-53. On the per capita basis, the annual rate of growth or decline was +2.7 percent in 1947-53, and -.2 percent in 1953-58." The recovery in 1959 has raised the average per capita advance from 1953 to the present to

about 0.6 percent, which is only about one fifth the Soviet rate during the same period.

If you like to play numbers games, you can make assumptions about the present *levels* of GNP in the two countries (American experts seem to think that the Soviet figure is about 40 percent of the American, while the Soviet experts put the proportion at nearer 50 percent) and about what relative rates of growth are likely to hold in the future, and on the basis of these assumptions you can fix a date at which the Soviet Union will overtake the United States in per capita GNP. For our part, we do not put much stock in such projections: the important thing is that the Russians are catching up with us fast and are likely to continue to do so for as far ahead as it is useful to try to look. Measured by this particular test, Soviet socialism is winning the contest with American capitalism hands down.

Of course we are often told nowadays that output figures—total or per capita—are not what really count. This notion has been especially strongly supported by J. K. Galbraith in his well-known book *The Affluent Society*. Galbraith argues that if vital public services are starved and increments of output take the form of private trivia (including large allowances for styling, advertising, expense accounts, and so on), there is little if any gain for society. Under such circumstances, the blind worship of increased production for its own sake is a form of fetishism which rational people can hardly indulge in. This is no doubt quite true, as far it goes. But it must on no account be allowed to obscure the fact that the whole world—including the United States—urgently needs increased output *of the right kind*—more education, more scientific research, more public health services, better urban environments, more social security for the young and the old and the sick, capital for aid to underdeveloped peoples, and so on and so forth almost ad infinitum. These are precisely the things that American capitalism increasingly neglects—hence those Galbraithian tears. But they are also the things that Soviet socialism increasingly provides out of its expanded total production. From which we must conclude that the United States is losing the battle not only in proportion to its slower rate of growth but also—and in the long run more importantly—in proportion to the greater irrationality of the kind of goods and services it turns out.

It may be objected that we are jumping to conclusions on the basis of insufficient evidence, that as the Soviet Union catches up

with the United States it will also catch up with all our worst failures and weaknesses. There was a time when this objection would have been very plausible indeed—when the Russians were putting all their emphasis on mere quantity of output and apparently forgetting that in the long run the composition of output was bound to be of even greater importance. In recent times, however, they have given evidence of appreciating this truth. For example, Khrushchev, after his trip to the United States, had some most interesting and encouraging things to say about the future use of the automobile, which threatens to become the nemesis of America's predominantly urban civilization. Speaking in Vladivostok early in October of this year, Khrushchev is reported to have made the following statements:

It is not at all our aim to compete with the Americans in the production of vast numbers of cars. We are developing and shall continue to develop the production of motor cars, but not in the same way as the Americans. . . . We want to create a scheme for the use of motor cars that will differ from the system prevailing in the capitalist countries. . . . In our country cars will be used more rationally than in America. Taxi pools will be widely developed in our country where people will obtain cars as needed. Why should one have to rack one's brains over where to put the car? Why be bothered with it? Such a system will be more satisfactory in meeting the interests of both the community and the individual. (*New York Herald Tribune*, October 9, 1959.)

We agree, enthusiastically; and we imagine that a growing number of harassed car-owners in America's increasingly congested cities will agree too. A comprehensive and strictly cost-oriented (as opposed to profit-oriented) car-rental system, taken together with imaginative development of railroads and urban rapid transit, offers genuine hope of a rational and workable solution of the problem of the city and the automobile. Why is it that the Russians can adopt such a program while every year we get more and more hopelessly caught in the contradictions of the private-car system? The answer, put in simplest terms, is that they are in control of their economy while our economy is in control of us.

As long as this situation obtains, that is to say, as long as the Russians operate under a planned public-enterprise system and we under an anarchic private-enterprise system, they will grow not only much more rapidly but also much more rationally. The truth is that

they are on the way to solving the great socio-economic problems of the twentieth century which threaten to overwhelm us. And this, rather than all the quantitative indexes that can be devised by the most ingenious of statisticians, is the ultimate test by which the systems will be judged.

India Versus China

To some, the comparison of India and China may seem irrelevant to the capitalism-socialism struggle. The state, it is argued, plays a major role in India, and the country is striving to create its own form of socialism. We concede both points, without however conceding the conclusion. Despite the important economic role of the state, it is nevertheless true that "of the current flow of goods and services in the Indian economy the private sector still creates 90 percent." (Wilfred Malenbaum, "India and China: Contrasts in Development Performance," *American Economic Review*, June 1959.) And economic planning in India, unlike in the USSR and China, is not a set of binding directives to the various operating units of the economy but rather a guide to government policy and a hopeful projection of what the economy may accomplish in the plan period. This difference is fundamental, and as long as it exists India must be classified as essentially a private-enterprise economy.

Once this point is settled, we can see that the contest between India and China comes as close to meeting the requirements of a laboratory experiment as one is ever likely to find in the realm of social phenomena. The two countries are fairly comparable in size, population, natural resources, standard of living, and stage of economic development. Moreover, they both embarked upon a deliberate program of economic development at about the same time, roughly ten years ago. How have they fared?

In answering this question we have made use of the facts and figures assembled by Malenbaum in the study just referred to. Malenbaum is a professor of economics at MIT, a specialist on India, and very far from biased in favor of either China or socialism.

From 1950 to 1959, Malenbaum finds that India achieved an annual rate of growth of real income of almost 3.5 percent. "Over essentially the same period, the Chinese growth rate was at least three times as great." Since, however, China's population is assumed to have been growing somewhat faster than India's, the margin in favor of China on a per capita basis is smaller—say three times or a little

less. This, it will be noted, is just about the margin of superiority of the Soviet growth rate over the long-term American trend.*

In the case of underdeveloped countries, however, overall growth rates are much less important than the pattern of resource utilization which underlies them and may be obscured by them. And in this connection the key question is that of investment: long-run economic development depends on achieving and maintaining a high rate of capital accumulation. It is therefore of the greatest importance that it is precisely here that China's superiority over India is most marked. By the late 1950s, the real level of gross investment in India was approximately double that of 1950; in China, it was five times as large. As a consequence, "aggregate industrial output in the modern sector has made much greater progress in China." Contrary to the teachings of the economics textbooks, this steadily widening margin of investment superiority was not achieved by depressing Chinese living standards below those of India. According to Malenbaum's calculations, average household consumption in China was from 10 to 15 percent below that of India in 1952, i.e. at the beginning of the development programs of the two countries. Despite a much higher rate of saving and investment, and despite a more rapid growth of population, household consumption levels in China began to forge ahead of India's by 1955 and have steadily widened the gap since. This, of course, takes no account of China's much more ample public services (education, sanitation, public health, and so on) which all visitors to the two countries observe and comment on.

Malenbaum sums up his study of the India-versus-China economic contest as follows: "The present analysis thus indicates economic development overwhelmingly favorable to the Chinese effort,

* A word about statistics: These estimates are not affected by the downward revision by the Chinese authorities of the early reports of the size of the 1958 harvest. (This revision, incidentally, put the gain in 1958 over 1957 at "only" 35 percent instead of the originally reported 100 percent.) At the same time, it should be noted that some students of Chinese national income statistics regard the estimates used by Malenbaum (essentially Central Intelligence Agency estimates) as too high. Cf., for example, T. C. Liu, "Structural Changes in the Economy of the Chinese Mainland, 1933 to 1952-57," *American Economic Review, Supplement*, May, 1959. It is noteworthy, however, that even such a resourceful and resolute anti-Communist statistician as Professor Liu comes up with a *lower limit* to the Chinese growth rate which is still well *above* the Indian rate. At the other end of the spectrum, of course, official Chinese figures put the Chinese growth rate at *more* than three times the Indian rate. For reasons indicated in the text, the issue is by no means a crucial one.

both with respect to actual performance and to potential for further growth."

Shifting of the Balance

It is of course impossible to predict precisely what effect growing socialist successes in the key America-versus-Russia and India-versus-China contests will have. Much will depend on noneconomic developments which are much harder to anticipate. For example, there is no doubt that the people of the Soviet Union enjoy more freedom now than they did ten years ago, and that there is a real trend towards the liberalization and democratization of the country's political system. We have no doubt that the further and faster this goes, the greater will be the impact of socialist economic successes on the world's uncommitted countries. Again, China was one of the leading architects of the live-and-let-live philosophy which was proclaimed to the world at the Bandung Conference in 1955, and there can be little doubt that this peaceful attitude contributed importantly to the attractiveness of the Chinese example in the eyes of other underdeveloped countries. By the same token, China's show of aggressiveness along the Sino-Indian border in recent months can only have the effect of repelling potential sympathizers and imitators (including friends of China like ourselves*).

* This is not the right occasion for an analysis of the Sino-Indian border dispute, but a footnote digression may not be out of place. We have never believed that Chinese actions were a manifestation of some sort of innate aggressiveness. A socialist China has no need for additional territory as such, and it is incredible that the Chinese leadership is unaware that what it has been doing is costing China dear in terms of the friendship of Indians and other uncommitted peoples. They must, therefore, have what they consider a strong enough reason to make them willing to pay the price. On the basis of the available facts, it would appear to be at least a possibility that the road the Chinese have built in a part of Ladakh which New Delhi considers to be Indian territory, is the key to the whole situation. It is well known that China has had difficulty putting down the Tibetan counter-revolution (on which, incidentally, no socialist, or liberal either for that matter, need waste any tears: the Tibetan theocracy was probably as corrupt and oppressive a regime as existed anywhere in the world). The main purpose of the Ladakh road seems to have been to facilitate this operation, and Peking took advantage of the undoubtedly indeterminate (in international law) character of the border to press a claim for the territory through which the road passes. Recent statements by Chou En-lai suggest that China is willing to trade formal recognition of the McMahon Line in the east for the area containing the road in the west. Indian statements that New Delhi would have been happy to build and operate the road as a joint project with the Chinese would doubtless arouse little enthusiasm in Peking in view of India's

There are sure to be many further developments and incidents in the political and cultural fields which will retard or speed up the impact of socialist successes on the nonsocialist countries. But we do not believe for a minute that any of them, or all of them taken together, will be decisive. The overwhelmingly important facts of the present-day world are (1) that the great majority of its inhabitants "live like dogs and die like flies," and (2) that they know they don't have to, and fully intend to *do* something about it. As quickly as they become convinced—as sooner or later they must—that socialism offers them the best chance to escape from their misery, nothing is going to stop them from embracing socialism. And nothing will convince them so fast or so thoroughly as the sensational *economic* victories of socialism in the two great battles of the systems which are now being fought out before what is quite literally a world-wide audience.

We confidently believe that historians of the future, looking back on the 1960s, will report that these were the central themes of an eventful and exciting decade.

A Capitalist Comeback?

One thing, of course, could knock all these calculations and prognostications into a cocked hat. That would be a real capitalist comeback—an appropriate and effective response to the challenge of socialist economic achievement. What are the chances?

That nothing of the kind is happening now is perfectly obvious. We have already noted that American economic growth, far from accelerating, is seriously lagging and on a per capita basis has come to a virtual standstill. Similarly, India is having all kinds of difficulties with her Second Five Year Plan, particularly in the crucial area of agricultural output. Meanwhile, China is continuing the "great leap forward" of the past two years, and the Soviet Union is overfulfilling the targets of the ambitious Seven Year Plan on which she is now fully embarked.

Nor are the advanced capitalist countries making any appreciable headway in their efforts to persuade the backward and colonial lands that the road to economic progress is paved with foreign aid from

openly proclaimed sympathy for the Tibetan counter-revolutionaries. If this analysis is correct, the border dispute is an outgrowth of the Tibetan affair and may prove difficult or impossible to settle as long as New Delhi and Peking are at loggerheads over the central issue. On the other hand, the analysis also suggests that all talk about China's drive to conquer India and/or other countries in southern Asia is nonsense.

Washington, London, Paris, and Bonn. If anything, the reverse would appear to be the case. Recent calculations by United Nations agencies indicate that in the last two years the underdeveloped countries have lost in the form of lower prices for their exports at least as much as they have gained in the form of foreign loans and grants. The advanced capitalist countries, it seems, are as good at collecting foreign aid as they are at dishing it out. But in any case foreign aid can be of little help to a backward country unless it is accompanied by a genuine social revolution which makes a clean sweep of the old regime and brings to power a new and vigorous leadership with a sense of mission and an ability to arouse the latent enthusiasm and idealism of its people. In the past, however, foreign aid from capitalist countries has invariably had the purpose of *preventing* such a revolution, not of encouraging it, and this fact alone has been enough to render the aid ineffectual or worse. Witness the cases of South Korea, South Vietnam, Formosa, Laos, Pakistan, and Iran, countries which have received the lion's share of American aid to backward countries, and all of which are today showpieces of economic stagnation and political corruption.

No, on the basis of the record to date there is certainly no reason to expect a capitalist comeback.

But perhaps the capitalists are waking up to the desperate plight their beloved system is falling into? Perhaps they soon will begin to do something effective to check their own decline and fall? Or maybe there are signs of a mass political movement to bring to power a new leadership with new ideas and aspirations, even within the framework of the present system?

It is quite possible to find statements of prominent public figures which might lend themselves to some such interpretation. We are being continually warned that the Russians will catch up with us—if we don't step up our rate of economic growth, improve our educational system, develop a sense of purpose at least as serious as theirs, and so on and so forth. Allen Dulles tells us, Adlai Stevenson tells us, George F. Kennan tells us, and many lesser lights as well. We are also warned that if we don't help India and other underdeveloped countries on a massive scale, China will win the economic race and thereby attract the vast majority of mankind into the socialist camp.

The warnings, we know, are very well founded indeed. It cannot be said that the capitalist ruling classes of the world are without knowledge of what is going on, or even of where present historical

trends must inevitably lead. They know all right. But the question is whether it will do them any good. And the answer of history, surely, is that it won't and can't. There has probably never been a case in all history of the decline and fall of a social order, which was not clearly recognized by wise contemporaries who were actually caught up in the process. Many are the laments and warnings and exhortations that have survived, but there is no record anywhere, so far as we know, of a ruling class effectively *acting* on the knowledge available to it to check and reverse the downward slide.

There are good reasons for this. Professor Frank Notestein, the well known Princeton demographer, has written in another context:

The problem lies in the nature of our society rather than in the knowledge of it . . . and the real problem is that effective social action requires much more than knowledge. Before information can lead to effective action, it must operate through a set of beliefs, loyalties, and moral judgments. . . . They do not change automatically and smoothly with the changing knowledge of the rational world. (Quoted by Arthur Krock, *The New York Times*, October 10, 1959.)

Let us apply this wise observation to the problem before us, that is to say, the prospect that capitalism will be able to stage an effective comeback at this late stage in the process of its historic decline. What are the "beliefs, loyalties, and moral judgments" that govern the actions, as distinct from the pronouncements, of America's business and political leaders, and indeed of most of the rest of the American people too? (We confine our attention here to the United States, but most of what we have to say could apply as well, *mutatis mutandis*, to Britain and France and West Germany and the other countries which have been predominantly shaped by capitalism during the last two centuries or so.)

The beliefs, loyalties, and moral judgments by which we live are all related to the central institution of capitalist society, private property in the means of production. "Private" means autonomous and self-determining; "property" means protection by the state against invasion or interference by others. The means of production, the very basis of the life of society, are controlled by many autonomous units each of which is guaranteed in its autonomy by the sovereign power of society itself. In such a system, the individual units do not and *cannot* pursue the common good. Any attempt to do so would lead to chaos and disaster. Each *must* pursue its own private interest; and

since none is self-sufficient, this goal must be sought through entering into exchange relations with others. Production for the market and production for profit are thus inseparable corollaries of private property in the means of production. Under such conditions, the interests of society will be furthered only to the extent that a system operating on these principles achieves results which in the nature of the case were never intended by the isolated atoms into which society has been decomposed.

Now it is perfectly clear that such a society needs above all else an overriding faith that the individual who best serves his own interests is at the same time best serving the public interest. It must believe—and instill the belief into all its members—that there is a profound harmony between the interests of the autonomous (i.e. property-owning) individual and the interests of society. Stripped of complications and subtleties, this has been the central theme for some four centuries of bourgeois philosophy, bourgeois religion, bourgeois morals, bourgeois social science—in a word, of bourgeois ideology. And, inevitably, its rejection has been the central theme of all the great dissenters, who looked, some backward and some forward, to a condition of human affairs in which there could be a *direct identification* of the interests of individual and society.

The extent to which bourgeois ideology has come to pervade the mentality of the various capitalist countries has, of course, varied in ways and for reasons too numerous and complicated to be dealt with here. We only note that in no country has it struck such deep roots or achieved such complete domination as in the United States. Here, thanks to a virtually empty continent and seemingly unlimited natural resources, the principles of private property could be allowed to operate unchecked, and at the same time could produce results in the form of a more or less steady rise of wealth and living standards which provided grounds for belief in the objective "truth" of bourgeois ideology. The fact that the American experience during the 18th and 19th centuries was unique in history and could never conceivably be duplicated elsewhere or again may have been remarked, but it played no part in shaping the mentality of the American people.

Here, then, is the background of the beliefs, loyalties, and moral judgments that shape our actions in the middle of the 20th century. We believe that self-seeking serves the common good, that nothing should be done without a *quid pro quo*, that a man's worth is measured by his wealth. Our loyalties are, in rapidly descending order, to

ourselves, our families, our localities, and the nation; we recognize no loyalty to foreigners and still less to humanity as such. Our moral judgments are variations on the theme that that is good which succeeds, with success naturally being defined in individual rather than social terms.

Our institutions embody these beliefs, loyalties, and moral judgments. Business is naked profit-grabbing, and politics is its handmaiden. Our checks-and-balances, federal-state constitutional system gives a free rein to local and special interests while paralyzing the potentially counterbalancing power of the federal executive. Our political parties are cartels of state machines, our legislatures assemblages of delegates bought and paid for by the propertied interests of the regions and localities. Those who are not in business or politics are in the rackets, if indeed it is any longer possible to draw the dividing line between these three great occupational categories. Young people prepare themselves to get theirs in the various approved ways, and if they see no chance they vent their hatred and frustration by swelling the rapidly growing ranks of juvenile delinquents.

A one-sided and exaggerated picture, some will say. Of course it is. There is no other way than selection and emphasis to uncover the important truths. The question is not whether Americans don't also have many fine and amiable qualities. Again, of course they do. The question is whether the beliefs, loyalties, and moral judgments by which they live are of a sort to encourage, or even permit, the kind of action that would be necessary for capitalism to stage a comeback in its global race with socialism. And the answer, at least to those who will take the trouble to clear their minds of cant and humbug, should be perfectly obvious. Our institutions are designed to facilitate self-seeking and to prevent any kind of direct attack on the problems facing society as a whole. And both leaders and people have so far succumbed to the convenient doctrine that the way to help society is to help yourself to whatever you can lay your hands on, that they utterly lack both the will and the ability to incur the sacrifices and submit to the discipline without which no serious national effort is even thinkable.

Not so many years ago George F. Kennan authored the doctrine of containment, according to which constant and sustained pressure by the United States on the Soviet bloc would eventually lead to the latter's breakup. He has learned a lot since then, as can be seen from a recent speech to the Women's National Democratic Club:

If you ask me . . . whether a country in the state this country is in today: with no highly developed sense of national purpose, with the overwhelming accent of life on personal comfort and amusement, with a dearth of public services and a surfeit of privately sold gadgetry, with a chaotic transportation system, with its great urban areas being gradually disintegrated by the headlong switch to motor transportation, with an educational system where quality has been extensively sacrificed to quantity, and with insufficient social discipline even to keep its major industries functioning without grievous interruptions—if you ask me whether such a country has, over the long run, good chances of competing with a purposeful, serious and disciplined society such as that of the Soviet Union, I must say that the answer is “no.” (*The New Leader*, November 16, 1959.)

What Mr. Kennan fails to tell is only that this corruption of a society is not due to an act of God or some quirk of the American character but rather to the blighting effect of more than a century's exposure to the purest capitalism the world has ever seen. To imagine that knowledge of the facts or the exhortations of wise men will suddenly work a miracle of transformation is the sheerest sort of self-delusion.

As we enter the decade of the 1960s, we can hear the bell tolling clear and loud—and we know for whom it tolls. It tolls for a system which long ago exhausted its creativity and is now being pushed off the historical stage, all too slowly but none the less surely, by another system which has already proved its great superiority in serving the basic needs of harassed and suffering humanity.

(December 15, 1959)

Christmas is over. Uncork your ambition!
 Back to the battle! Come on, competition!
 Down with all sentiment, can scrupulosity!
 Commerce has nothing to gain by jocosity;
 Money is all that is worth all your labors;
 Crowd your competitors, nix on your neighbors!
 Push 'em aside in a passionate hurry,
 Argue and bustle and bargain and worry!
 Frenzy yourself into sickness and dizziness—
 Christmas is over and Business is Business.

—Franklin P. Adams

INDIA: SHOCK AND REVELATION

BY CORLISS LAMONT

On our long trip around the world in the spring and summer of 1959 my wife and I stepped into a Soviet jet one hot July day at Tashkent in Soviet Central Asia, and in the most exciting flight we had ever taken soared over the snow-capped Himalayas into northern India. It took only about three hours to reach Delhi. As we struggled through the Indian customs and out to a taxi, no less than six porters insisted on helping us to carry our seven bags—a sign of the immense poverty that burdens India.

Delhi became the capital of India only in 1931, and the section that functions as the seat of government is known as New Delhi. It is a spacious and well-planned city, with fine government buildings, parks, and apartment houses.

The older section of the city, Old Delhi, where we spent much of our time, is more picturesque than the new part and also contains the chief slums of the metropolitan area. The appalling poverty of the Indian people was readily apparent to anyone walking or driving through the streets and alleys of Old Delhi. On every hand there are wretched beggars, both young and old, some of them quite disfigured. It is a horrible fact that beggar parents in the Eastern countries will sometimes mutilate their children in order to make their begging more effective.

In Old Delhi, too, we saw at first-hand the meaning of cow worship in India. Often a cow would saunter across a main street along which we were driving in a taxi; the taxi would then have to make a detour, especially if the cow decided to lie down. When we were walking on the sidewalk, frequently a cow would be smack in our path. We watched cows calmly munching vegetables from vegetable stalls along the street; the owners could not interfere because the cow is a sacred animal and *must* be fed. Over all of India wander literally millions of cows, a large proportion of them diseased. They have the right of way over both human beings and vehicles.

Dr. Lamont, a Lecturer in Philosophy at Columbia University, has recently returned from a trip around the world. He is the author of many books, of which Dialogue on John Dewey is the latest.

There are also plenty of bulls on the loose. A professor who had taught at the University of Calcutta told me that one day a big bull wandered onto the campus. No one was pleased, but no one dared to prevent a sacred animal from munching the grass. A week or so later the bull charged and gored a student who was riding a bicycle through the campus. The young man almost died. Only then did somebody gently usher the bull off the university grounds, still free to roam and gore at will. There have been many instances of bulls killing Indian men and women.

When we had tea with Malcolm MacDonald, British High Commissioner to India and son of England's first Labor Premier, Ramsay MacDonald, he told us that the cow situation had become worse since the establishment of Indian independence in 1947. While the British were still in control, they did not interfere with cow worship; but neither did they encourage it. Shortly after independence, however, the right wing of the Congress Party forced through a law prohibiting the killing of cattle throughout the whole of India. Monkeys, too, are sacred animals and constitute a destructive nuisance in many parts of the country.

Cow worship is of course closely tied up with the belief in reincarnation, which is a fundamental doctrine in the Hindu religion. The Hindus—and there are approximately 320 million of them out of India's 400 million population—are reluctant to take the life of any animal. They think that if you kill a cow, you may in effect be killing some deceased relative.*

Indian cow worship and the law against the slaughter of cattle prevent the utilization of what could be a very substantial source of fresh meat. This is a major reason why the vast majority of Indians are undernourished. Furthermore, the cows and monkeys eat tons and tons of food that ought to be going to human beings. I know of no other nation where the dominant religion has such a direct and deleterious effect on nutrition and health as in India.

When I visited Calcutta, I witnessed aspects of Hinduism that

* The Buddhists, one of the smaller sects in India, also believe in incarnation. When I was in Japan, where Buddhism is very influential, I read in a newspaper that there would probably be at least 1,000 suicides about the time when Crown Prince Akihito and his wife have their first baby. Each of the thousand individuals concerned is convinced that if he can arrange to die at the precise moment the baby is born, his soul will be reincarnated in it and he will in effect become a member of the royal family and perhaps Emperor.

clearly belong in the category of primitive religion. One Saturday morning I went to the temple of the Goddess Kali, an important Hindu deity who has three eyes: one each for the past, the present, and the future. In the stone courtyard of the temple, fire worship and animal sacrifice were going on. One Hindu family after another came in leading a little bleating goat and turned it over to a burly executioner. He pinioned the struggling animal in a sort of guillotine and quickly cut off its head with a big sharp knife. The head and the body fell to the pavement, and blood gushed out over the stones. Then a priest stepped forward, dipped his forefinger into the goat's blood and put a red blood mark on the middle of the forehead of each worshipper, including small children. An old woman squatting nearby took over the head of each goat and cut away, for the priests of the temple, the parts suitable to eat. Dogs lapped up the pools of blood; and the sacrificer carried home the body of the goat to eat. For the Hindus the goat represents animal passion. When you sacrifice him, that symbolizes winning control over your own passions, killing them, as it were.

I walked out of the temple grounds and down the street outside. It was lined with beggars, some of them stark naked, seeking alms from the crowds who came to worship Kali. When four or five of these beggars spotted me as a foreigner and literally surrounded me, I broke into a run in order to escape.

Of course there is much that is splendid about India, including its magnificent art and historic buildings, its firm stand for world peace and disarmament throughout the postwar period, the intellectual alertness of its educated class, and the economic aspirations embodied in the Five Year Plans that the Government has been carrying through in order to raise the standard of living and advance towards socialism. The Second Five Year Plan started in April 1956 and runs through March 1961.

But the economic and social problems are so formidable that I do not see how Prime Minister Nehru, whom I admire as one of the leading statesmen of this century, and his Congress Party are going to solve them. The population of this sub-continent is increasing at the rate of at least seven million a year; and birth control is making only slight progress. One of Nehru's Cabinet ministers was recently quoted as saying that during the next decade probably some 15 million Indians would starve to death. That is one well-known way in which economic problems are "solved."

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Although Prime Minister Nehru and the Congress Party are formally committed to the establishment of democratic socialism, the Indians I talked with told me that to a considerable degree only lip service is being paid to this aim. The Congress Party has not been militant in pushing through its economic and social programs, and many of its members are conspicuous for their apathy and lassitude. While my Indian friends did not look upon the Communist Party as the solution, they thought that the best hope for the ultimate success of Nehru and his associates was for them to acquire some of the militancy characteristic of the Communists.

A first priority for a truly militant policy on the part of the Congress Party would be the elimination of the graft that is widespread throughout governmental administration, both at the federal and the state levels. Another priority would be the general institution of elementary efficiency. As Arthur Bonner, CBS correspondent who has lived in India for more than five years, states in his informative article, "India's Masses":

Entering a government office is like stepping back fifty years or more. There are few filing cabinets and paper clips. Papers are attached by a string threaded through a hole in one corner and then wrapped in a folder tied together by another string. A code letter is pinned to the cover, and the name of the file is registered in a ledger. The file is then tossed on a shelf along with mounds of others. The registers are tossed somewhere else, and how any file is ever found again is a wonder. (*The Atlantic*, October 1959, p. 50.)

Looking back now on my globe-circling tour, I feel that my experiences in India were the most significant of the whole trip. For in no major country had I ever seen before such dreadful poverty, such a disease-ridden people, such backward religion, and such abysmal and widespread ignorance. To me as an American the whole situation was a great shock, and a valuable shock. And it made me understand more fully the 1917 Communist Revolution in Russia and the 1949 Communist Revolution in China, since in those two countries living conditions for the masses of the people were similar to what exists in India today.

When the Chinese Communists won power in 1949, living standards were even worse in China than in India. A United Nations Statistical Bulletin, *National and per Capita Incomes, 70 Countries, 1949*, estimates the per capita income in India as the equivalent of

\$57, as compared to China's \$27. These estimates do not of course tell the whole story about comparative standards of living, but there is no doubt that the Chinese level had been declining, owing to disastrous floods, wide-scale famine, civil and international war.

The important point is that when a people numbering tens or hundreds of millions, lives generation after generation in misery and semi-starvation, it is not difficult to comprehend why they may eventually explode into revolutionary violence in hopes that a new socioeconomic system will provide for their basic needs and give them a better chance to enjoy the good things of this life. News of the dramatic economic upsurge in mainland China over the past decade is not only reaching the Indian intellectuals, but is also seeping through to the masses of the population. And unless India's Five Year Plans bring about more rapid progress than at present, the example of Communist China will steadily grow more persuasive among the Indians and other peoples of the East.

Another point that India brought into focus for me was the whole relation between a country's economic system and the functioning of democracy. Political democracy in India today is weak and faltering, with Prime Minister Nehru frequently playing the role of a wise father. Max Lerner, commenting recently on the military dictatorships that have taken over in the Middle East and Southeastern Asia, stated:

The deeper truth is that most of the new Asian nations simply do not have the economic, political, administrative and social base on which a functioning democracy can yet be built. We are learning these days that a lasting democracy is the end-product of a long process of development, in which men learn in their daily lives to value and trust each other as equal persons, and leaders and administrators are trained to give them direction. (*New York Post*, October 23, 1959.)

What I want to stress in this picture is the *economic* base as affecting the educational prerequisites for democracy. While I was in India I kept thinking of John Dewey's insistence that there cannot be properly functioning democratic institutions unless the people are sufficiently educated to possess the information and understanding for voting intelligently on public issues. Nobody can pretend that this is the case in India. And in this huge country there do not exist even the *material* necessities—in the way of schoolhouses, college buildings, pencils, paper, book publishing, and the wherewithal for teach-

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ers' salaries—adequately to educate the electorate.

Thus 74 percent of the Indian population remains illiterate. Only some 50 percent of the children 6 to 11 years old attend primary school; about 10 percent of children 14 to 17 go to high school; and a mere one percent of men and women 17 to 23 are students at colleges or universities. Turning to other aspects of education important for political awareness, we find that the daily circulation of newspapers in India is 3.1 million for a population of over 400 million, while radio sets number a little more than 1.5 million. TV has only just been introduced.

Again, reflecting on India's educational situation, I saw more clearly not only why right-wing dictatorships had come into power in nearby countries with similar conditions, such as Pakistan, Burma, and Thailand, but also why left-wing dictatorships had achieved striking successes in Soviet Russia and China. This statement leaves unqualified my immense preference for the use of democratic and peaceful procedures everywhere in the world for effecting economic and social change.

The revolutionary spirit is manifested not by *methods* but by *aims*, not by the *how* but by the *what*. . . . To determine whether a man is a revolutionary or not, inquire *what* he wants, not *how* he wants it.

—Daniel De Leon

Our idea of ultimate improvement went far beyond Democracy, and would class us decidedly under the general designation of Socialists.

While we repudiated with the greatest energy that tyranny of society over the individual which most Socialistic systems are supposed to involve, we yet looked forward to a time when society will no longer be divided into the idle and the industrious; when the rule that they who do not work shall not eat, will be applied not to paupers only, but impartially to all; when the division of the produce of labor, instead of depending, as in so great a degree it now does, on the accident of birth, will be made by concert on an acknowledged principle of justice; and when it will no longer be, or be thought to be, impossible for human beings to exert themselves strenuously in procuring benefits which are not to be exclusively their own, but to be shared with the society they belong to.

The social problem of the future we considered to be, how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labor.

—John Stuart Mill

BITTERSWEET PILLS

BY ALEXANDER L. CROSBY

Man fumbles through a world of uncertainties. Theologians cannot agree on probable arrangements for the second coming, politicians do not know whether Pat and Checkers and Dick will move in when Mamie and Ike move out, and scientists are unable to decide whether the hemlock cup is now filled with cranberry juice.

But one thing has been made certain by a legion of editorial writers, statesmen, and turncoats: The road to communism is paved with confusion. When orderly patterns of government and economics break down, the Reds come riding in.

Curiosity has always drawn me to any scene of confusion. Let me emphasize that I do not advocate the violent overthrow of anything, except Robert Moses. Nor do I advocate arson. But I like to go to fires and I would hope to be a spectator at a change of government. So far, the disturbances I have seen have been no more revolutionary than an argument between two cab drivers over responsibility for a crumpled fender, or a babbling around a quiet citizen leading a pet skunk on a leash.

It was my notion that the fateful confusion would begin in some working-class district with an abundance of paving stones, but the *New York Times* of December 8th revealed that the locale was quite different. The seat of confusion is the executive offices of Schering Corporation, Merck & Co., Chas. Pfizer & Co., and the Upjohn Company. At first thought it seems incredible that these four drug manufacturers with 1958 net sales totaling \$650,677,000 would be working, in effect, to commit suicide. But there are many contradictions in capitalism, and this is plainly one of them.

Data gathered by the Senate's Antitrust and Monopoly Subcommittee showed, said the *Times*, that pills for arthritis cost \$1.57 a hundred to make, were sold to drugstores for \$17.90 (a markup of 1040 percent), and were priced for consumers at \$29.83 (a markup of 1800 percent). Interestingly, the *Times* computed the markups at

A former newspaperman and now a free-lance writer of pamphlets and children's books, Mr. Crosby advises us that he has never paid more than 17c per 100 for the only pills he uses: aspirin.

1118 percent and 1863 percent respectively, which shows how confusion spreads.

The obvious benefits of such markups are not felt by most consumers. A friend in social work told me about a white collar man with a wife and two children and \$75 a week. He might have scrimped through except the wife had multiple sclerosis and the doctor tried a year's futile treatment with cortisone. The drug bill was \$80 a month, so the husband took a second job as bus boy in a restaurant.

When Senator Kefauver suggested that the 1800 percent markup for prednisolone tablets was a bit rough on the 11 million sufferers from arthritis, President Francis C. Brown of Schering explained that the company had to make enough money to find ways to make still better pills. The purchaser's dilemma, he said, was "a matter of inadequate income rather than excessive prices." Indeed, the drug people saw nothing excessive in markups that went as high as 7000 percent.

Schering's Law may be formulated as: "Adequate research for the benefit of mankind requires a sales price at least 19 times greater than manufacturing cost." (This thesis drew a protest on December 11th from Donald I. Rogers, business editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*. Mr. Rogers argued that in the capitalistic system the risks of research should be borne by the shareholders, not by the consumers.)

Suppose a doctor, adhering to Schering rather than Rogers, embarked on a research program for the benefit of his patients. The \$15 fee for an office visit would jump to \$285. Other applications of Schering's Law will be studied by business leaders. Lacking exact data on manufacturing costs, I can only guess that a properly researched automobile would run to \$28,500, scientifically laid eggs would be \$4.75 a dozen, enriched shoes would be \$152, and a miracle suit of clothes would cost \$475.

If the post office should ever hire scientists to devise methods of delivering the mail on time, a letter would require a 76¢ stamp and special delivery service would be \$5.75 extra. The *New York Times*, now a nickel, would go up to 99¢, by the *Times's* arithmetic.

But Mr. Brown says the real problem is "inadequate income." (Scratch the skin of a capitalist and you smell the blood of a socialist.) Incomes would be considerably more inadequate if Schering's Law became the law of all producers. Even George Meany might take to a picket line, for the first time in his life, defending a plumb-

er's right to a cost-of-living scale 19 times higher—\$2,892.75 a week.

The new scale would merely enable the plumber to keep up with Schering. Suppose the plumbers' union decided on a comprehensive research program? A lot of things are wrong with plumbing. Drains don't drain, toilets don't flush, showers run hot and cold instead of integrated. Germs stalk the bathroom and kitchen and seep into the baby's room. Germs mean disease. Disease means disablement or death. People are dying because plumbing isn't what it could be.

Of course the plumbers would have to charge for their life-giving research—19 times more. So the scale goes up to \$54,962.25 a week, or \$2,867,037 a year. Some reactionary patrons of plumbers might denounce this leap forward as unjustified. There will always be a few who resist new concepts. Hippocrates, Copernicus, Vesalius, Galileo, Harvey, Newton, Priestley, Darwin, Lister, Koch, Curie, and Einstein had their quota of doubters and scoffers.

Yet the ideas of these men triumphed. And so will those of the plumbers. I can see their picket signs now, redolent with the poetry of the drug industry: "Unfair to plumbers creating the raw materials of human betterment"; "Dedicated to ceaseless war on the depredations of disease"; "Basic member of the Nation's health team: Your Neighborhood Plumber"; "Building for a sanitary brotherhood of man"; and "Guarding the harvest years of senior citizens—Department of Bacteriological Research and Engineering, Plumbers Local 606."

The plumbers will win. But it will be a hollow victory. Untutored in capitalistic techniques of tax dodging and trapped by the withholding system, their \$2,867,037 yearly wage will shrink, after taxes, to a pitiful \$222,034. This is going to create resentment in labor circles. Any government that tries to extract \$2,645,003 from every plumber and like amounts from each research-minded electrician, shoemaker, bus driver, butcher, barber, farmer, miner, lumberjack, and fisherman will face trouble—trouble of historic, tea-dumping caliber.

Mr. Brown and his competitors, the visionaries who dream up identical prices for identical pills, will be swept away in the confusion. When scholars of the future investigate the causes of the great upheaval, the *Times* of December 8, 1959, will be a primary source. There they will find that a man named Brown began it.

CLASS AND VOTING IN BRITAIN

BY RAYMOND WILLIAMS

In July 1958 I proposed a debate on why the British Labor Party would lose the next election. An expected blow is no easier to take than one unexpected, but at least, now that the third successive electoral defeat has come, the resultant debate can be viewed with a certain calm.

The hard questions on the decline of the Labor Party began for some of us too long ago for us to be swept off our feet by the latest round of rethinking and advice. At breakfast on the morning after polling, before all the results were in, I was phoned by BBC Television and told the latest interpretation of what the Labor Party should now do—come to terms with capitalism, drop the socialist clause in its constitution, get rid of its working-class and trade-union image. I rejected the interpretation and heard no more from them. But this, obviously, was the line many people had ready, backed by an interpretation of British society—that the working class was becoming “deproletarianized,” which in fact I first heard in 1945. It is certainly of the utmost importance that we should try to understand the complex social and cultural changes in mid-century British society, but some of the most widely distributed current versions are so glib and tendentious that, though they often come from academics, we must regard them as playing politics rather than as serious social analysis.

The most popular and also the silliest version is that which proves the “deproletarianization” of the British working class by the decline in the Labor vote and the fact that many working-class people voted Conservative in 1959. The process is explained by the increasing availability of modern houses, television, washing machines, and cars to the better paid workers. This would make sense if, when working-class standards were low (as in the depression in the thirties), and when more “proletarian” conditions might have been supposed to exist, the great majority of the working class had in fact voted Labor. But what are the facts? In 1924 the Labor vote was 5½ mil-

Raymond Williams, author of Culture and Society and other distinguished books, teaches at Oxford. He is one of the contributors to the recently-published MR Press book, Conviction.

lion, in 1929 $8\frac{1}{2}$ million, in 1931 $6\frac{1}{2}$ million, in 1935 $8\frac{1}{2}$ million. Through all the bleak years of depression and widespread unemployment, this is the actual record, subject to fluctuation with changes in the general political situation, but in any case getting nowhere near a massive working-class Labor poll. In the famous victory of 1945, the Labor vote rose to 12 million, and a slump in the Conservative vote brought Labor a large parliamentary majority. After this peak, according to the popular version, Labor lost electoral support because its first measures towards socialism were disliked. How curious, then, that in 1950 the Labor vote was 13,265,610, and in 1951 the highest figure ever polled by a British party, 13,949,105! The "proletarian" situation of the depression had produced $8\frac{1}{2}$ million votes, the full-employment situation of 1951 nearly 14 million. And what of the elections since then, with more consumer goods and consumer credit, breaking up this "proletariat" of the past? In 1955, on a lower total poll, 12,405,246 Labor votes. In 1959, on a poll still much lower than 1951, 12,216,166. The loss in voters in the last two elections is marked. In 1955 it was blamed on bad polling weather, internal dissensions (these had also been serious in 1951), and apathy. In 1959, the weather was perfect, the dissension was less, and the election received more publicity, through television, than ever before. Yet the vote went down again, and, most significantly, the total poll was still some 5 percent lower than in 1951. It is a difficult situation to analyze, but we need not be hindered by myths of a "proletariat" and "deproletarianization." The Labor vote now, in its third defeat, is still nearly half as much again as it was in the worst periods of poverty and depression.

The British working class has in fact never voted solidly Labor, as anyone who grew up in a working class community would know without being told. If Labor had ever got a regular 70 percent of working class voters, it would have been permanently in power. It is a crass misunderstanding of working class politics to suppose that one necessarily votes for a proletarian party if one was born in a proletarian position. The building of the working class movement, whether in the trade unions or the Labor Party, has been a continuous struggle to create an appropriate political and social consciousness among the workers themselves. Added to the difficulties of education and propaganda has been a continuous campaign, by those with most to lose, to check and confuse and sidetrack this movement. At times hardly any headway has been made; at times there has been real

defeat; at times, again, important advance. There is no simple rising graph, for the struggle does not take place in a vacuum. It is profoundly affected by changing political conditions and by phases of change in the society as a whole. This is the real historical context from which any serious contemporary analysis must begin.

My own view of the political fluctuations since World War II can be briefly stated. The Labor victory of 1945 was outstandingly an expression of determination not to return to prewar conditions, with which the Conservatives were widely identified. The very low Conservative vote in that year ($8\frac{1}{2}$ million) is as significant as the Labor increase. Between 1945 and 1951, the evidence of polls suggests a loss by Labor of the proportion of middle class support which had helped it in 1945. Yet its vote continued to increase, which can only mean that more and more working class voters were turning to its positive support. The huge vote in 1951, still in conditions of postwar austerity and planning, was the most conscious working class determination ever recorded in Britain, to reject the conditions of prewar society and to go on with the new methods. But by 1951, the Conservative Party had been radically reorganized, not only technically, but in terms of policy. It was identified now, not with a return to the thirties, but with basic acceptance of Labor's Welfare State, and with the relaxation of austerity and controls. The Conservatives could not beat Labor in the popular vote in 1951, but, by the vagaries of the British electoral system (huge Labor majorities piling up and wasting in the heavy industrial areas) it regained parliamentary power. Millions of middle-class and lower-middle-class voters had come back to it, and its traditional working class vote had at least survived. And then, in government, it remained faithful to its new identity.

There were incidental cuts in the social services and redistributions of taxation favoring the better-off, but all in the context of a more visibly prosperous economy and a general reduction in taxation. The dread of the thirties lifted; the Welfare State was not dismantled; earnings—with full employment, overtime, and an increasing number of wives working—rose, and there was plenty to buy. True, the Conservatives did as little as they could to redress poverty and basic inequality, but a given minimum—what one Conservative M.P. has called "Butler Socialism"—was the price of power, as they had learned in 1945, and they were willing and able to pay it. In such conditions, with each new election preceded by a boom in spending

power, the Labor Party's permanent task of creating a new kind of social consciousness was just too difficult. The real crimes of the last Conservative government were in foreign (Suez) and imperial (Africa) affairs, but these, to politically uneducated workers, meant comparatively little. In 1955, the Conservatives received 49.8 percent of votes cast, Labor 46.3 percent, Liberals 2.7 percent. In 1959, the Conservative figure was 49.3 percent, Labor 43.6 percent, Liberals 6 percent. The significant change is the redistribution of the anti-Conservative vote to the advantage of Liberals and the disadvantage of Labor. It is probable that the Liberals gained many young voters and many middle-class voters disenchanted by Suez and African policies. Labor gained nothing in the nation as a whole. Its local gains were in areas of high unemployment where the old dread of the thirties was revived; its losses were in areas of prosperity and expansion where the new-style Conservatism seemed to be working well and where fear of change, fear of disturbance, and return to postwar austerity (with which now, in its turn, Labor could be identified) counted most.

If this general analysis is accepted, the voting fluctuations can be understood in terms of the political situation and overall conditions in society, rather than in spectacular terms of "deproletarianization" and the "end of a class-divided society." Millions of workers and their wives voted Conservative in this election as in previous elections. The significant questions are what kinds of workers, and whether there are any really new patterns in this. My own memory of working class Conservatives (people rather than percentages) is of two main categories: the poor, often the very poor, who had a family tradition of Conservative voting; the socially anxious who identified Conservatism with respectability and Labor with roughness and commonness. I still know many people of both these kinds. Such attitudes survive longest in rural areas where economic change does least to upset the traditional voting habit, and in mixed areas where class distinctions are most tense and most evident and where respectability has to be established in terms of the single family rather than of such proud communities as the mining village. If we look at a political map of Britain, over the century, we are reminded of the great social diversity of working class life, and of its electoral effects. A map of Labor representation is virtually a map of the coalfields and the great towns, with the significant exception of some of the Celtic areas where English social patterns are less marked and where Labor can

get in even in scattered rural constituencies. Conservative representation obtains in almost all the English counties, some Scottish counties, Northern Ireland (where English politics are confused by questions of religion and partition), and the smaller English towns. This geographical diversity is crucial, for it is one key to adequate social analysis. Thus Wales is overwhelmingly Labor (as could be guessed from the number of Welshmen in British Labor politics), and in 1959 Scotland got a Labor majority for the first time. The great English conurbations have been Labor throughout the postwar period. There have been marginal changes, but in the heavy industrial areas and in the great towns the working class identification with Labor has been and remains high (though in no sense total or even nearly so). These are easily identifiable kinds of community, and on the whole they suggest no distinctively new political pattern. It is in other kinds of community that the real difficulty begins, though the relatively undisturbed English rural counties, and the famous middle-class residential areas and resorts, with their huge Conservative majorities, need not detain us: they, too, show little real change.

To approach the position elsewhere, we must go back to the general figures. At the time of writing, we have not yet a complete analysis for 1959, but the overall voting is near enough to that of 1955 to make certain figures from that year still relevant. The total working class vote in 1955 split 55½ percent to Labor, 40½ percent to Conservatives. But this has to be set alongside the significant figures for distribution by sex, which in a year of Conservative victory in the popular vote, showed a 50 percent Labor to 45½ percent Conservative split among men, and a 54 percent Conservative to 42 percent Labor split among women. This is really crucial, for of course it makes nonsense of any crude analysis of voting in class terms alone. The inevitable inference is that a proportionately large part of the working class Conservative vote is cast by women. If we take this inference into the general social situation, much of the political history of the 1950s is explained. The increased availability of consumer goods, and indeed the whole spending boom, passes mainly through the women's hands. This is their real social experience, whereas the social experience of the men is much more compounded with knowledge of work situations—the classic places where Labor consciousness has been created. In the solid industrial communities other influences come to bear; but much of the new Britain, where the marginal changes seem mainly to have occurred, has no strong social identity

and places women in a particularly exposed social position. Here patterns of visible expenditure and behavior establish, among people who have not been neighbors for long, a sense of status rather than of class. It is significant that the most prosperous section of British publishing is the field of women's magazines which both meet and mold this situation, offering the precise patterns of consumer activity and conformist respectability which the new postwar suburban Conservatism has sustained. If there is any social and cultural change of radical importance, it is this.

There may have been other changes in the postwar working class. Many of the better-paid workers vote Conservative, but this is not really a new situation. The political affiliations of the "aristocracy of labor" have fluctuated considerably in British history, and it was noted as long ago as 1873 that "artisans' wives hold the wives of laborers to be of a lower social grade, and very often will either not neighbor them at all, or else in a patronizing way." The successful worker, similarly, will in certain periods find the class ties proposed to him unacceptable; his prosperity is linked to his firm, and thence to the system. But I doubt if there has been more than a marginal change of this kind. Evidence from an experienced Labor candidate with detailed records in a mixed and prosperous area, suggests a swing from Labor among such men of between 2 and 3 percent. This is enough to swing an election, but hardly enough to make a whole class consciousness obsolete. It is truly nonsense to write, as R. T. Mackenzie has written, that "the workers in the Midlands and the South have clearly accepted the Conservative slogan 'You never had it so good,'" for if this had been the case, if Labor consciousness among these workers had been eroded on the scale this suggests, there would have been spectacular changes in the popular vote, whereas in fact the swing was on the average less than 2 percent. We do not know which people changed, but it can be noted that in one of the most prosperous industries—automobile production—there has been a succession of strikes, which hardly suggests any major decline in working class consciousness, though in interrupting spending it has been unpopular with women and with a minority of the men. A sense of proportion in estimating changes of this kind is vitally necessary.

The implications of the defeat, and of such social changes as can be seriously established, can be variously interpreted when it comes to reassessing Labor policy. All sorts of people have been trying, year

in and year out, to get Labor to drop its socialist affiliations. All sorts of people have been trying to separate the Labor Party from the trade unions. It is difficult to prophesy, but my impression is that the Labor Party, in defeat, is surprisingly solid and unrepentant. A break-away from the unions is in any case impossible, and the fact is that the unions are more extensively committed to such socialist measures as nationalization than is the Party itself. But does this mean that with conditions against it the Labor Party, unable to change its basic nature, is committed to repeated defeat? I would say at once that it may well be defeated again, in 1964, 1969, and thereafter. Even if it could drop socialism, and my estimate is that dilution is the maximum the right-wing critics can hope for, I believe it would still not win power while the Conservatives maintain their present balance between consumer capitalism and the Welfare State. Let this balance be disturbed, by slump or major reaction, and in any case Labor would come back. Yet a party cannot be run on a basis of waiting for ruin or folly.

What new things are necessary, in this changing society?

The central problem, as I see it, is cultural. The society of individual consumers which is now being propagandized by all the weight of mass advertising and mass publications, needs a new kind of socialist analysis and alternative. We are full of confectionery and short of hospitals; loaded with cars and ludicrously short of decent roads; facing an educational challenge of major proportions, yet continuing a limited class system of schools. These are incidental examples of a crisis which needs different analysis and different programs from those appropriate to poverty and depression. That such analysis and such programs must be socialist seems more clear than ever before. Only in projecting a new kind of community, a new kind of social consciousness, can the Labor Party offer anything distinctive and positive. It may take a long time, and some may be impatient for power and therefore restive. But, short of ruin or folly, this is the only way in which the Labor Party can now ever win, and it is not after all anything out of the tradition that is being offered: Labor came into existence, not as an alternative party to run this society, but as a means of making a different society. Experience teaches, and we may have to wait some time, though the present balance is in fact quite delicate and could very easily be disturbed. But, short or long, the use of the future is evident: basic analysis, basic education, basic democratic organization.

I can conclude by reporting from personal experience of the group of young people who are calling themselves the New Left. They saw this defeat coming, and they were the first to begin this kind of cultural analysis of the situation that made it inevitable. They are growing in numbers all the time and are already the most active young Left generation since the war. In the work they now propose, in association with the Labor movement, they begin without illusions and without excuses. They learned their disillusion by watching successful Conservatism; they began their response by discovering what socialism might be. Their contempt, now, for those who would capitulate to disillusion, is unbounded. Since they did not expect power they can accept the facts as they are. And since they are socialists, in a capitalist society which they deeply oppose, they turn from the bright visions of Mr. Gaitskell in Downing Street, and go on with the long and difficult work of making socialist consciousness. I think it would be a mistake for anyone to underrate them, or the future of the Labor Party.

WHY INDUSTRY MOVES

BY FRANK BELLAMY

American industry is on the move. Leaving behind gaping parking lots, smokeless plant chimneys, and hundreds of thousands of former employees who can't find work elsewhere, it is trekking southward and westward.

The migration has been impelled by industry's drive for new markets to exploit, new technology to invest in, new ways and new places in which to reduce costs and boost profits. Many companies have been content to move a few miles to the outskirts of cities they've

A New Jersey newspaperman, Mr. Bellamy is a frequent contributor to progressive journals.

always been in. But many others have decided on long hauls to the South or West to save money by virtue of greater production efficiency, lower freight costs and taxes, and to make greater profits by virtue of lower labor costs.

Roughly speaking, the new area of industrial expansion forms a quarter moon starting in Washington and Oregon, curving down through California and Texas, and winding up in the South Atlantic states. Just as this region has steadily increased its proportionate share of total manufacturing jobs and outlays for new plant and equipment, so have New England and, in lesser degree, the Middle Atlantic and Great Lakes declined in relative importance.

The exodus is slow, as all migration is. But the move from cramped, obsolete, grimy factories in equally cramped, obsolete, grimy cities is unmistakable. The pace is as swift as it was in the days when the World War II dispersion program began dramatically to re-shape the locational profile of American industry. And it's not merely a matter of industry trailing after population movements. Although adequate statistics do not exist, it appears that migrating industry has drawn as many migrants after it as there were migrants who preceded it.

Texas, national leader in petroleum refining with a fast-growing petrochemical industry, increased its population 38 percent in the 13 years between the end of World War II and mid-1958. California, with huge postwar capital investments in auto, aircraft, and missile factories, jumped 53 percent. Florida's population went up 80 percent. Equally spectacular were the percentage gains of these three states in capital investment and factory employment. As the table below shows, the South Atlantic, Southwest, and Pacific regions raised their combined share of total United States capital expenditures from 28.1 percent in 1947 to 32.8 percent 10 years later. Their combined factory work force went from 21.0 to 25.3 percent in this same period.

Although the gains of these three rapidly expanding regions emphasize their increasingly important role in the national economy, the bulk of manufacturing production and employment is still concentrated in the two established industrial regions of the Northeast. However, the Middle Atlantic and Great Lakes regions are slipping. Their combined share of United States capital investments dropped from 53.3 percent in 1947 to 49.7 in 1957; their share of factory employment from 57.8 to 54.3 percent.

Regional Distribution of Capital Expenditures and
Employment in Manufacturing, as Percent of U.S. Total

	Capital Expenditures		Manufacturing Employment	
	1947	1957	1947	1957
United States	\$6,003,873,000 100.0	\$12,145,052,000 100.0	14,294,304 100.0	17,105,000 100.0
New England	7.0	5.1	10.3	8.6
Middle Atlantic	22.2	18.2	27.6	26.1
Great Lakes	31.1	31.5	30.2	28.2
West North Central	5.7	4.6	5.5	5.9
South Atlantic	11.3	12.5	10.7	11.2
South Central	4.3	6.0	4.4	4.6
Southwest	7.6	10.4	3.9	4.7
Mountain	1.6	1.8	1.0	1.3
Pacific	9.2	9.9	6.4	9.4

[Adapted from U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1947 Census of Manufactures*, Vol. III, and *Annual Survey of Manufactures*.]

Industrial dispersion has fostered a semi-science called site selection. When a company plans to move, or set up a new branch plant, it seldom chooses the site offhand. *Industrial Development* (now *Industrial Development and Manufacturers Record*) carried in its October 1957 issue a checklist of no less than 700 factors that a company should look into before deciding on a site for a new plant. Among these 700 factors were eight major ones which, taken together, largely explain why United States industry is on the move and why it has chosen the South and the West to move to. These eight major pulls of economic geography are: climate, power, availability of work force, transportation, obsolescence of old plants, federal taxes, state, and local taxes, and—most important of all—labor.

Climate. The hospitable climate of Florida and California is a significant factor in enticing industries as well as people from the more congested and cold areas. However, Southern California's deficiency in fresh water supplies has already slowed industrial growth there and threatens to curtail it severely unless overcome by vast expenditures for new water-storage schemes.

Power. The role of new sources of power in remaking the United States industrial profile was well summarized by Herbert O. Jason in *Management Review* (June 1957). "The increased use of oil and gas," he pointed out, "has lessened the importance of coal supplies which were a key factor in industrial location up to a generation ago. And within the next 20 years nuclear reactors will probably begin

to supply a significant fraction of industry's power requirements, giving further stimulation to industrial dispersion. The chief known deposits of reactor fuels are quite remote from the principal sources of coal, oil and gas. Moreover, a nuclear reactor, unlike other power plants, need not be located close to its source of fuel supply for economical operation, because nuclear fuels are light and easily transportable."

Work Force. In the old days factories were tied to large cities because of their need for an adequate supply of skilled labor. However, industry is becoming less and less dependent upon these reservoirs of skilled labor in the old industrial centers. Notwithstanding the increasing complexity of modern manufacturing techniques, the proportion of skilled workers in the national labor force has remained fairly constant at 13-14 percent since 1920. With the proportion of unskilled laborers falling, the proportion of semi-skilled workers has been growing. And these semi-skilled workers are all over, in the South and West as well as the Northeast, in predominantly rural areas as well as large cities. Only a few industries (tool and die, for instance) remain tied to skilled workers to such an extent that they usually stay put in large cities.

Transportation. Transportation costs have risen far more than production costs. Rail freight rates, for instance, have more than doubled in the last 13 years, rising by 107.7 percent since mid-1946, in 14 different increases. The increased cost of distribution has provided a significant push toward regional production. As freight rates have gone up, the economic feasibility (and competitive necessity) of branch plants has grown. No longer can a single production unit effectively saturate the nearly 3 million square miles of this country and economically supply manufactured goods to 180 million people. No longer is the auto industry confined to the Detroit area. General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler now operate plants all over the country. The practice of pricing cars f.o.b. Detroit has swelled the profits of auto producers with final assembly plants on the East and West coasts. Whereas only four assembled automobiles can be loaded into a railroad freight car, some 12 "knocked-down" (unassembled) cars can be shipped from Detroit and assembled into final form at these plants. The customer, poor fellow, pays the "phantom freight" on a fully assembled car shipped from Detroit even though the car was actually shipped unassembled from Detroit to a plant near the dealer.

Obsolescence of Old Plants. This fall Chrysler abandoned its old

body manufacturing and Plymouth assembly plant at Evansville, Indiana, and transferred the operations to a new, modern, \$50 million plant at Valley Park, Missouri, 20 miles from St. Louis. The new plant, highly automated, requires 1,000 to 1,500 fewer workers. Chrysler is only one of hundreds of firms switching production from obsolete, multi-story, mill-type buildings in cramped cities to modern one-story plants in areas where land is cheap and vacant. Old plants frustrate management's compulsion to reduce the number of workers and get more production out of those remaining. New plants, laid out horizontally and designed specifically to accommodate automated machinery, satisfy this job-cutting and speed-up drive. And as long as a new plant is needed, it's cheaper in the long run to build it in the sticks, and perhaps in another region altogether, than on the site of a demolished factory in an old city.

The meat packing industry understands this principle well. Its exodus from Chicago illustrates it best. Slaughtering and packing operations, declining in Chicago for years, came to a virtual end this summer by decision of Armour and Swift, the nation's two largest meat packers. Two thousand Armour workers lost their jobs, and the Armour plant is being torn down. Swift once employed nearly 10,000 in the Windy City; now there are about 900 left. Wilson, the third of the industry's "Big Four," left the city long ago. Chief cause of the general exodus is new technology in slaughtering and packing, and particularly in ham-making-technology that old buildings are inadequate to handle. Said the *New York Times*, June 16: "Both Swift & Co. and Armour & Co. blamed obsolescence of their stock yards buildings and facilities for their decisions [to move elsewhere]. Most of their buildings were fifty years old or more. Rehabilitation of existing facilities was deemed economically unsound."

Federal Taxes. The federal government set about in 1951 to encourage industrial dispersal for "security" reasons. Under the National Industrial Dispersion Program inaugurated in that year by President Truman, munition makers are penalized if they don't locate plants outside of "target areas." Firms that do not conform to the government's dispersion policy are barred from rapid tax amortization for new armaments facilities. Those that keep new plants away from congested urban areas and military installations can write off part of their plant investment in five years instead of the usual 20 or 25 years. In the period from July 1, 1952, to March 1, 1957, 78.4 percent of all projects were found to conform to dispersion cri-

teria; 13.8 percent were granted exceptions on proof of hardship; and only 7.7 percent of the plants refused to meet dispersion standards and were denied fast tax write-offs. Thus the government's dispersion program has met with substantial success and added another factor in the spreading out of American industry.

State and Local Taxes. Small cities in the less industrialized sections of the country, notably the South, are—and have been for some time—in the process of shifting their economic base from agriculture to industry. They want to become boom towns, not ghost towns, and the only way they can do it is to take advantage of the thousands of farm workers displaced by the continuing mechanization in agriculture. These cities need new factories to absorb surplus labor, earn profits, pay taxes. In their desperation to attract industry of almost any character at any price, they are often ready to take runaway plants, even if they are only fly-by-nighters. And they are not overly scrupulous in their methods of attracting those plants. Many Southern towns have "industrial development commissions" which go up North trying to entice manufacturers to move plants South. These local agencies not only promote. Their most important chore is to promise one or more of the following: (1) Exemption from state and local taxes. Louisiana leads the tax-inducement parade with a straight 10-year exemption from all state, parish, and municipal levies; 10 other states allow forgiveness of taxes by municipalities and counties. (2) Easy financing. Ten states allow their municipalities to issue bonds for erection of new or expanded plants. (3) Buying of sites for sale or gift to new industry. (4) Building or buying of plants for sale, lease, or outright gift to incoming companies. (5) Payment of moving expenses. Alabama recently added a new gimmick: an offer to build a 3,000-foot airstrip next to any new large plant built in the state.

How effective are such bribes in luring new industry from the North? The answer seems to be that they have been relatively unimportant in inducing heavy industry to move South, but, on the other hand, have done real damage in light industries, particularly in textiles and apparel. But even in these industries, financial subsidies have proved less potent a lure than the promise (which invariably accompanies such subsidies) of low-wage, non-union, "docile" labor.

Labor. It's no secret that wages are lower in the South. The Bureau of Labor Statistics gave a good idea of just how much lower

in its recent report, *Factory Workers' Earnings, May 1958*. The report found that the average American factory production worker earned \$1.97 an hour straight-time in May 1958, while the average Southern worker earned 34 cents less—\$1.63 a straight-time hour. The North-South wage differential is particularly conspicuous in soft-goods. Softgoods manufacturers have an easy-to-see incentive to move plants South in order to capitalize on lower wages there. Lower wages are the chief reason that the South now employs three-fifths of all textile workers and one-fourth of all garment workers.

But wage differentials play a minor role in the migration of heavy industry. For one thing, the differentials are not so great. In primary metal products, contrary to what might be expected, Southern workers in May 1958 earned not less, but 2 cents more, than those in the Northeast. This is the accomplishment of the United Steelworkers, which some years ago forced elimination of differentials in all steel companies with interregional locations. Collective bargaining has also sharply curtailed regional wage differentials in coal mining. But differentials once eliminated don't necessarily stay eliminated. A case in point is Swift & Co. In 1957 the United Packinghouse Workers achieved in its agreement with Swift the elimination of the Southern differential. But the compromise settlement that ended this fall's seven-week Swift strike once again imposed a lower wage for all Southern workers in the Swift chain.

Wages constitute the bulk of what management pays for labor power. But not all. Fringe benefits can range from 6 to 60 cents an hour, and are generally lower in the South. Also to be taken into account are turnover, absenteeism, incentives, productivity, and frequency of strikes. Even in industries without regional wage differentials, a Southern location may bring definite advantages to a company. Southern workers, disunited by Negro-white antagonisms, are in a weaker bargaining position than workers up North and are more inclined to put up with existing wage rates. Union militancy is less deep-seated, strikes and work stoppages less common. In addition, management can install job-eliminating machinery more readily in a Southern plant than in a Northern one. This alone may prove far more profitable to management than even a substantial wage differential.

Establishment of branch plants in the South, and anywhere else for that matter, weakens union solidarity. It gives management an opening to play workers in one branch plant against workers in

WHY INDUSTRY MOVES

another. An example of this was provided this year in the strike of the International Union of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO, against the Erie Resistor Corporation. The strike began March 31. Some 450 production workers walked out at the Erie plant. Some 400 clerical and supervisory workers stayed in. Many of these volunteered for factory jobs and Erie was able to maintain limited production. It also stepped up production at its four branch plants in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Mississippi. In other words, it played the non-striking workers at the four plants against the 450 striking workers at the Erie plant. The inability or unwillingness of the workers in those plants to help out their Erie brothers resulted in a complete rout for the IUE. On the 85th day of the strike the Erie workers accepted a contract that gave them nothing more than the company had offered from the beginning.

Severance pay, while it may help a laid-off worker until he can find another job, is powerless as a deterrent against plant shifts. For one thing, the cost of severance pay is far less than the savings the employer expects in the new plant. For another, most workers are not entitled to severance pay.

The harsh fact is that companies, especially those in highly competitive industries, don't always have a choice. In many cases, if they are to remain competitive, they *must* run away. They would be at a competitive disadvantage if they didn't. Humanitarian considerations don't enter in. It's beside the point that employees are forced into the alternative of pulling up roots and moving with the plant or leaving the labor market for the human scrap heap. It's beside the point that so much human and social waste is created in the abandoned areas. Profits come first, stockholders before workers, the corporation before the community. It's each company for itself, and woe to the worker or the community left behind when the moving van pulls out.

The terrible social dislocations wrought by unplanned geographical changes in economic activity could, of course, be mitigated by governmental action. The federal government could do much to lighten the burden of displaced workers and declining cities. It could not, however, persuade corporations to put public good before private profits. Only public ownership of industry with production for use, not profit, can bring industrial decentralization under planned, orderly, and humane control.

WORLD EVENTS

By Scott Nearing

A Cuban David?

As a poor relation living near the property line of a rich and powerful uncle, Cuba faces endless trouble. Batista minimized the trouble by encouraging and promoting United States interests in the island. Batista offered the colossus of the North generous options to explore and exploit Cuban minerals, a dominant role in the island's most important industry, sugar, and a wide open Havana for alcoholics, gamblers, and well-heeled executives seeking relaxation and relief from the arduous task of brain-washing and plundering the "freest people on earth." As a further token of his subserviency to the *Yanquis*, Batista made no protest against the continued occupation of Cuba's Guantanamo Bay by the United States Navy.

Batista's pro-Washington policy paid handsomely, both in prestige and dollars. Politically it was a flop. Cuban workers, farmers, professionals, students, and intellectuals gained little or nothing from gringo domination of their homeland. Many of them suffered from the frustrations and humiliations inevitably associated with the economic, cultural, and military occupation of a small neighbor by a great power.

Batista held his power for years by corruption and police terror. But the sturdiest dictatorship, backed by domestic vested interests and financed and supported by foreign money and foreign arms, cannot survive indefinitely, particularly in the present era of revolutionary ferment, strident nationalism, imperialist decay, and successful socialist construction. Against this planet-wide background of spectacular social change, the farmers, workers, professionals, students, and intellectuals of Cuba drove Batista from power and welcomed to leadership a group of young, fighting idealists who promised to put Cuban interests above those of the Northern Goliath.

There is nothing novel about the Cuban situation. It has recurred frequently in the recent history of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Owen Lattimore in his *Solution in Asia* described and documented the process, taking as his chief example the alienation of Chiang Kai-shek and his final rejection by the Chinese people. Chiang had promised to defend and promote Chinese interests. After 1927 he became a spokesman for the landlords, money lenders, and businessmen of

China, and allied himself with foreign imperialists. Lattimore pointed out that both in theory and in practice such policies and practices must result in the loss of home-town support, and in eventual defeat and replacement of the local leadership.

Quislings and stooges of the big plunderers and exploiters have tried, through the ages, to fool all the people all the time. Their failure is one of the axioms of history.

Recent Cuban events have followed the traditional sequence. Castro's new broom has begun to sweep. Will it be a perfunctory lick and promise, around the furniture and across the center of the room, or will it get into the corners and turn into a thoroughgoing spring housecleaning?

If Castro and his followers are content to do a lick-and-promise job, they will encounter little Washington opposition. In Cuba, as elsewhere among Washington's Latin American dependencies, dictatorships have come and gone, without endangering the profits of United Fruit, Bethlehem Steel, Standard Oil, the National City Bank, and the liquor and gambling fraternity. But if Castro should prove to be serious—if he should try to live up to his promises and really demand and secure self-determination for the Cuban people—then, indeed, the disturbances in Cuba would be a horse of another color.

Goliath of the North

Washington, like the rest of the world, is watching every Cuban gesture and move with the closest attention. The trial and execution of terrorists and traitors were deplored. The termination of exploration rights held by American and other foreign interests, and the takeover of large estates have been denounced. *U.S. News & World Report* for November 30, headlined its Cuban story "The Big Steal: Grab of U.S. Property Abroad." Subheaded were the following sentences:

Land seizures in Cuba are being eyed in other Latin American countries, raising fears in U.S. that grabbing will become contagious.

Stealing is rampant under Cuba's Castro. The victims: U.S. investors, with vast holdings of land, buildings, other properties.

Now come stirrings in other countries.

In Brazil, there's a mood to grab. In Argentina, state governments are threatening. In Panama, there is agitation to take over the Canal. In Guatemala a revolutionary party, with ideas of theft, is making gains.

The stakes are huge: 13 billions of U.S. capital invested throughout Latin America.

The *U.S. News* story begins: "One of history's great steals is getting underway in Cuba. This is another in a series of steals—past, present and developing—that have been or are to be carried out in Latin America. The victim in each case is the U.S. investor who has worked, saved, planned, ventured and created the wealth to be stolen. The robber, in each case, is a government in search of easy ways to loot the wealth of others."

As *U.S. News* sees it, innocent, guileless, peace-loving United States "investors," in search of opportunities to live comfortably in North America on the products of South American resources and labor, are being challenged, harassed, and ousted by the outraged and irate Latin Americans, who have worked long and faithfully to produce interest and dividend payments on North American-owned stocks, bonds, and mortgages.

Destiny's Call to Castro

Castro can sell out—at almost any time. If he follows this course, like Batista and many of his predecessors, he can fill his safe deposit boxes and luxuriate as the leading beneficiary of Cuba's exploitation. Such a policy involves appeasement of Washington, repudiation by the home folks, and another tragic failure in the long hard road to Latin American independence and self-determination.

Or Castro may keep faith with his followers, the Cuban people, and with himself. This course leads inexorably along the main channels of present-day social advance. It involves the replacement of foreign economic, political, and military intervention and exploitation, by economic, political, and social self-determination. Economically, it leads to social ownership of the social means of production, and social and economic planning. Socially, it leads immediately to the welfare state and eventually to socialist construction.

Beginnings in these directions have already been made by a number of Latin American countries. The fate of progressive governments in British Guiana in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954 serve as a warning that such a program undertaken by a small Latin American country will be sternly repressed by Washington and its NATO side-partners.

Self-determination for Cuba, or any other single nation in the Western Hemisphere, with the possible exception of Canada, Argentina, and Brazil, depends upon understandings, alliances, and eventually federations of American states. Washington's silent junior part-

ners, satellites, and dependencies in the Western Hemisphere will either learn to stand together or they will continue to play their present inglorious and ignominious roles as stooges and catspaws of Washington and Wall Street.

How Strong Is the East Wind?

Attacks directed against United Fruit in Guatemala, the stoning of the United States Vice President in Venezuela, and the current invasion of the Canal Zone by angry citizens of Panama who are demanding the return of stolen property, have made Washington nervous and anxious. Within the past two decades the British invaders and occupiers have been driven out of India, while the Dutch have been expelled from Indonesia; and the French, after being defeated in Indo-China, are currently holding on in Africa only because they are being financed and supported by Washington.

Only a few years ago, self-satisfied British, French, and Dutch were confident that their progress and prosperity would last forever, as the European masters gathered super-profits from the abundant natural resources and cheap labor power of their colonies and dependencies. Recently, tolling bells in the imperial homelands and jubilant cries among the colonials have marked the passing of that historical phase.

Can the Latin Americans, bound hand and foot by economic, political, and diplomatic commitments to defend and promote the welfare of the United States ruling oligarchy, break the bonds with which Washington has bound them, and join the liberated peoples of Asia and Africa in a United States of the World?

How long will it be before the upsurge of nationalism which has been sweeping through Asia and Africa will get out of hand in the West Indies and Central and South America? Once the fires of liberation begin burning in the Western Hemisphere, the strong east winds now blowing in Asia and Africa may cross both oceans and carry the hot embers from Cuba or some other local brush fire across the pampas and uplands of all Latin America.

Washington wonders and watches with deep concern. Cuba is relatively small and weak. It lies under the lee of Uncle Sam's continental land mass. But it might easily become an example and a portent. If marines land in Cuba and if Latin America rallies to Castro's support, then, truly, the fat of imperial domination would be in the fire of a Western Hemispheric social revolution. If such a develop-

ment took place, David would have hurled the pebble destined to bring down Goliath.

The east wind is blowing. Castro knows it. Cubans feel it. Latin Americans are aware. *U.S. News* and the State Department sit on the anxious bench. Should the big-business-big-power occupiers and exploiters retire hurriedly but gracefully, as the British retired from India, or should they bleed themselves white as the French did in Indo-China until they go down to disaster in their Western Dien-bienphu?

Making Friends In Asia

Washington's obsessions with "white supremacy," "Asian ineptitude," "Communist conspiracy," and "positions of massive strength" are leading once again toward a debacle, this time in Laos. After professions of friendship and a handout of economic aid, United States officials are supplying the Laotians with an enlarged military mission, plus rifles, 105-millimeter howitzers, small machine guns, mortars, bazookas, recoilless rifles, anti-tank guns, light tanks, armored cars, trucks, small observer planes, and C-47 transport planes. (*New York Times*, October 25.) Presumably this equipment will solve all domestic and foreign problems.

How different is the Soviet procedure as described by the ferociously anti-Communist *U.S. News & World Report* for November 30. Afghanistan, an undeveloped country as large as Texas with 8 million inhabitants and a per capita yearly income of \$40, is receiving help from several sources: "The U.S. has given 93 million dollars in direct aid, and 51 million in loans. American spending is down to 7 million this year." "But everywhere you look, the Russians seem to be ahead." There are no Russian troops inside Afghanistan, but there are "an estimated 1200 Soviet technicians." While the United States has blundered for years on the Helmand Valley irrigation project, the Russians are building "power plants, textile factories, other industrial installations." From the Russians "Kabul got its first grain silo—the tallest building in the city, a flour mill, a mechanized bakery." "Gasoline storage tanks went up on the Oxus river across from the Soviet rail head." "The Russians are tunneling the Hindu Kush, the rugged mountain range in the north. When the tunnel is completed, Afghanistan will have an all-weather highway from Kabul to the Soviet border."

Afghanistan's Prime Minister, Sardar Mohammed Daoud, was

interviewed by a *U.S. News* regional editor who pointed to the extensive Soviet aid and asked the Prime Minister what it meant. The dialogue proceeded as follows:

"Our interpretation of this aid is quite simple. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union have been very good neighbors for 41 years. Our relations with the Soviet Union have developed on the basis of friendship and mutual esteem. Throughout these years, nothing has happened to mar this mutual trust. If you think the Soviet Union has other motives, you would be better off asking them what these motives are."

"Are there any strings to the Soviet aid?"

"We believe with sincerity that there are no strings tied to the Soviet aid program. If they wish to transform our country into what you call a "show window," we certainly would not object to that. It would be all to our advantage. The aid we are receiving, from whatever source it may be, is devoid of any political condition."

"Now that the Soviet Union is giving you tanks for your Army and planes for your Air Force, do you think there is any danger of Afghanistan's becoming too dependent on the Soviet Union for its military hardware?"

"You should remember the fact that only the major powers can make their own weapons. The other nations are either forced to buy their armaments or they receive them free from some major power. As far as we are concerned, we obtained our weapons on a purchase basis, and with no conditions imposed."

"Did you ask the United States for weapons?"

"Yes, and we waited a long time for an answer. When the answer finally came, it was not only in the negative but it was also a very curt one."

Aside from religion, there is perhaps nothing that so excites prejudices as the fear of being separated from the opportunity for profit.

—Joseph B. Eastman

Determined revolutionary activity coupled with a deep feeling for humanity, that alone is the real essence of socialism. A world must be overturned, but every tear that flows and might have been staunched is an accusation; and a man hurrying to a great deed who knocks down a child out of unfeeling carelessness commits a crime.

—Rosa Luxemburg

ILLUSION AND REALITY

BY NATHAN FRANKEL

In the September issue of MR, Samuel C. Florman asked whether the questions and doubts he raises could possibly be resolved by others. A careful rereading of his article convinces me that his chief problem is to distinguish between illusion and reality, and that the difficulty he has stems from three specific sources. These are perfectionism, the lack of a point of view, and the prejudging of the case he presents.

By perfectionism, I mean Mr. Florman's expectancy that both an ideal socialistic state and an actual socialistic state should be flawless. He forgets that socialists are also human beings, with human frailties. Any conceivable socialist state, or any actual socialist state, viewed without illusion, must necessarily exhibit shortcomings arising from differing human attitudes. Mr. Florman expresses this perfectionism by asking whether rulers in a socialist state would not find "that given *absolute* power, they still could not provide *absolute* contentment" (p. 173, emphasis supplied). Why must a particular social organization be counted good only if it provides "absolute" contentment?

Thus, if a socialist state conceived by Mr. Florman falls short of absolute perfection, the resulting human attitude expressed by him is either pessimism or cynicism.

The questions he poses illustrate this. He asks (p. 172) what we "think of the individual who adopts socialism as a means of expressing a neurotic rebellion against life itself." At the present time it is obvious that some persons who profess to be socialists, might, like others who do not, have what are called "neurotic" attitudes. This merely underscores the fact previously stated, that socialists or "socialists" are also human beings. This cannot detract from the merits of socialism as either a goal or an economic system.

Granted, too, that being human beings, some socialists might be opportunists in their personal life (p. 172). The expectancy that the advent of socialism would turn all human beings into angels is an illusion. But this, too, does not tarnish socialism as either an ideal or a

The author is a practicing attorney in New York City.

working system. Socialism can only be achieved by people living on this earth, which includes neurotics and opportunists.

Granted, too, that in evolving a viable socialist state individuals may be thrust into, or seize power, and abuse it. Neither life, history, nor the future, offers any kind of guarantee to us against this, except human resolve and action to prevent or change it. Uncertainty is a part of life. It is an illusion to expect otherwise.

In this context, is it really fair, Mr. Florman, as a "value judgment" to measure a whole society by the presence in Russia of "beatniks" (p. 173), or in the United States of juvenile gangs?

Besides perfectionism, the second source of Mr. Florman's difficulty appears to be a lack of point of view. Einstein taught us that one of the essential aspects of reality, or facts, is the position of the observer. Churchill has been a consistent Tory. He wished "to strangle Bolshevism in its cradle." Lenin, as a Communist, sought to establish and strengthen it. Was one *right* and the other *wrong*? Morris Raphael Cohen once observed to a student, "From your point of view, you are right, but your point of view is wrong." A socialist would deem Churchill's point of view wrong.

From whose point of view, Mr. Florman, do you view Augustine Rome, Elizabethan England, and Renaissance Italy? Is it the Medici or the serfs, Nero or the galley slaves, Sir Walter Raleigh or the yeomanry of England, displaced to make room for pastures? It makes quite a difference in the evaluation of these societies.

As a man of good will, you might have certain preferences: freedom, for example, as against slavery. A greater number of choices in life for most people living—isn't this a simpler way of evaluating a whole society, than by mystifying references to "Periclean Athens?"

Tories obviously prefer societies where aristocrats are privileged. But it is impossible for one actually to *prefer* such a society and still call himself a Socialist.

Even if we take Mr. Florman's criterion of "satisfactory," would not a society be preferable where more people are better off, in significant ways, than they were before?

Finally, Mr. Florman seems to have prejudged the case he himself presents. He begins by stating that as a man of good will, he works diligently to keep an open mind and to keep informed. Yet he characterizes socialist society as an "antiseptic dream society" (p. 174) where freedoms are relinquished "to emulate the economic efficiency of the insect world" (p. 174), suffering a "personal blight"—that this

sort of state "has a nightmare quality" (p. 173) where "the new ruling class" is primarily interested "in maintaining power, breeding intrigue, nepotism, and corruption." This hardly leaves room open for answering questions. Now, really, Mr. Florman, are you raising questions? Or aren't these really your judgments? And do you really think, in your own final words, that they are "graced with a touch of humility, humor, and doubt"? You can hardly call this the product of an "open mind," though made by a man of good will.

If I were to attempt to compress, in one sentence, Mr. Florman's difficulties, I would have to say that socialism is meant for human beings and not for saints.

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(continued from inside back cover)

the now defunct non-Communist oath provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law—going on in Denver against eleven members of the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union. The three-year-old conspiracy indictment was brought to trial while 30,000 members of the union had been on strike for months against the Big Five of the copper industry. Those who know the facts will want to send badly needed money to the Mine-Mill Defense Committee, 941 East 17th Ave., Denver, Colorado. Those who don't know the facts should write to the same address for information—and then support the striking miners and the defense of their leaders with a contribution.

Maybe the talk that the "students are waking up, the campuses are alive again" has some justification in fact. We don't know. But we do know that Vol. 1, No. 1 of *Studies on the Left*, "a journal of research, social theory, and review" put out by a group of Wisconsin University students, is a promising first issue of a scholarly magazine. It will appear three times a year, sub price \$2.50, single issue 85¢. Write to *Studies on the Left*, P.O. Box 2121, Madison, Wisconsin.

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(continued from inside front cover)

by Francis Newton, jazz critic of the *New Statesman*. It is a good book—the best in the field—but the field is obviously a specialized one. If you have no interest in jazz, then this book is definitely not for you; on the other hand, if you are a “cat” yourself, or if you know nothing about the subject but would like to understand one of the interesting social phenomena of our age, you will like this book. *The Jazz Scene*, 303 pages, complete with photographs, appendices, and a guide to further reading, was first published in England where the reviews were extremely favorable. It will be published here in March or April, at \$4, with a prepublication price of \$2.75. See back cover for complete table of contents. Order now if you are interested—but remember, we don’t ask you to buy this book if the subject has no appeal for you.

We ask those of you who have ordered Claud Cockburn’s *Crossing the Line* to be patient another month or so. The book was manufactured for us in England by the publisher there and has only just been dispatched. It will take several weeks to reach this side of the Atlantic, and then another week or more will be lost in Customs. You should be getting your copies some time in February—before publication date.

Those of you whose sub expires soon will note on the renewal slip you will receive that there is a blank available for renewing your sub via the Associates. New readers, particularly, are urged to join—1960 can become MR’s Big Expansion Year if you do your bit to help.

Readers in the San Francisco and Los Angeles areas who subscribe to the excellent FM radio station, KPFA, will be interested to learn that the editors of MR will broadcast a one-half hour program each month, beginning in January. It will be entitled “If This Be Reason.” Station WBAI in New York will be affiliated with KPFA in January and will also carry the MR broadcasts.

The latest of the series of excellent pamphlets published by the American Friends Service Committee (20 South 12th St., Philadelphia 7, Pa., 35¢ per copy) is as good as its predecessors. It is entitled *Labor and the Cold War*, by Stewart Meacham, who has had experience with the subject and knows how to write plainly and forcefully. Please order this informative and useful pamphlet direct from the AFSC, not from us.

MR readers may remember the name of Louis C. Wyman, the New Hampshire Attorney General who tried to put one of MR’s editors in jail a few years ago and was prevented from doing so only by the United States Supreme Court. Unfortunately, Mr. Wyman has had more success in the cases of Dr. Willard Uphaus and Mr. Hugo De Gregory. To the everlasting shame of New Hampshire, Dr. Uphaus was sent to jail on December 14. The Uphaus case has already had considerable publicity and we believe is certain to receive more as the enormity of the New Hampshire action begins to dawn on wider sections of the American public. The De Gregory case is less known but no less important. De Gregory took the Fifth Amendment and later was given “immunity” by a special New Hampshire statute, which of course is quite powerless to confer immunity from federal prosecution. The Supreme Court refused to hear De Gregory’s appeal, whereupon Wyman publicly stated, “This decision breaks the back of the Fifth Amendment as far as we are concerned.” A De Gregory Defense Committee has been formed and is badly in need of funds to fight this important case. Address all communications to Mrs. Priscilla di Giovanni, Treasurer, Box 103, Hanover Street Station, Boston 13, Massachusetts.

There is an important labor and civil liberties case—conspiracy to violate

(continued on page 352)



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